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Aristotle on Unity: Metaphysics Delta 6
Constantine Georgiadis, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario 
SAGP Meeting, New Orleans, April 1990
The brief passage on accidental unity (Èv κατά συμβεβηκόε) in Chapter 6 ‘of 
Metaphysics Δ (1015b 16-34) raises a number of questions for which the text does not 
provide explicit answers. Aristotle does not define the nature of accidental unity, no:' 
does he explain the status and character of the items which partake in accidental 
unities. One may wonder whether those items pertain to language, or to reality or 
whether they involve a certain relation of language to reality. Aristotle lists 
different examples which are purported to illustrate different kinds of accidental unity 
but those kinds are not described in general terms. Aristotle takes care, however, to 
explicate the conditions which underlie the specific use of each example of accidental 
unity.
I want to argue first, on the basis of clues provided by the text itself, that the 
locus of accidental unities is not the real, or objective, realm but the linguistic one. 
However, though the items involved in accidental unities are linguistic, they bear a 
relation to reality because of their character as denoting expressions. I shall 
subsequently discuss the sense in which a unity is accidental. Finally, I shall provide 
an analysis of the different kinds of accidental unity associated with Aristotle's 
examples, and explain the senses in which accidental unity may relate to a universal.
In his notes on Met. Δ6, Ross, without entertaining the problem of the status of 
accidental unities, enumerates the various kinds of accidental unity, by employing the 
terms substance. accident, co-accident and genus.1 It appears, then, that his 
interpretation of the passage is strictly ontological.
On the other hand, Kirwan seems to be aware of the possibility of a linguistic 
interpretation of accidental unities, for he notes that ' [i]n b 24-5 the combined items 
are verbal expressions, "portions of the formula"'. He dismisses, however, the 
importance of this, by stating that, 'Aristotle is being careless: it is primarily
things, not words, which are said to coincide ...'.2 Kirwan also speaks of examples 
such as artistic Coriscus as 'non-linguistic complexes'.3
Pace Ross and Kirwan, I think that there is evidence in the text which supports a 
linguistic interpretation of accidental unities. At b 18-19, Aristotle claims that 'it 
is the same thing to sav (είπεΐν) "Coriscus and the musical" (sc. are one) and "musical 
Coriscus" (sc. is one)'. Had Aristotle's concern been with entities themselves, one 
might have expected him to formulate his claim in objective terms without reference to 
statements. At b 24-5 Aristotle speaks of 'musical Coriscus', b μουσνκοε Kopto/cos, as 
one of the parts (θάτερον των μορίων) of a statement (εν τω λο'γφ) and similarly at b 26- 
7 he refers to 'musical Coriscus' and 'just Coriscus' as involving relations of parts 
(ίκατερου μέροε) in a statement. Finally at b 28-9 he speaks of an accident which is 
said (Χεηεται) of some universal name (των καθοΧου tlvSs 6νομ<χτων).
Seen as linguistic items, 'Coriscus', ' that-which-is-musical' or 'musical Coriscus' 
(povaiKbs Kop¿V/cos), 'just Coriscus' (StKauos YLoptaKos) are all denoting expressions 
which in specific combinations result in accidental unities. Of these, 'Coriscus' as 
the proper name of a man denotes an individual substance in its essential constitution, 
as an instance of the kind man: all the other expressions denote the same individual
2substance as qualified by an accidental characteristic (συμβεβηκόε) and as exemplifying 
the quasi-sortal associated with the given accidental characteristic. A nominalized 
adjective preceded by the definite neuter article, e.g. 'το μουσικόν' (that-which-is - 
musical), denotes, in the context of discourse about Coriscus, the individual substance, 
without explicit reference to its proper name, from the perspective of its accidental 
characteristic, musicalness. What is at issue, however, is not musicalness but a 
particular exemplifying the quasi-sortal musical thing derived from musicalness. On the 
other hand, the complex predicative-nominal phrase 'musical Coriscus' includes the 
attribute component 'musical' (μουσικόε)and the nominal component 'Coriscus' (KopioKos). 
The latter determines grammatically the gender and number of the former. The expression 
'musical Coriscus' explicitly denotes Coriscus precisely as an example of the quasi- 
sortal musical thing. There is no difference in the sortal expressed by 'that-which- 
is-musical' and by 'musical Coriscus' . The difference lies only in the fact that 
'musical Coriscus' is explicitly the denotans of Coriscus while 'that-which-is-musical' 
is only implicitly so. One and the same entity is denoted by 'Coriscus' and 'musical 
Coriscus' but it is denoted differently due to differences in the denoting expressions 
themselves.4 Such differences have to do either with the content of the denoting 
expressions or with their mode of denoting. 'Musical Coriscus' and 'just Coriscus' 
differ in their content in virtue of the different sortais, 'musical thing' and 'just 
thing', which they instantiate respectively. 'Musical Coriscus' and 'just Coriscus' do 
not differ, however, with respect to their mode of denoting which is in both cases the 
accidental mode of denoting. They both denote Coriscus qua something accidentally such- 
and-such (musical, just) and not qua something essentially so-and-so (a man). One and 
the same substance, Coriscus, is the object of denoting. Denoting expressions such as 
'that-which-is-musical' and 'that-which-is-just' (or 'musical Coriscus' and 'just 
Coriscus') indicate built-in dependence on substance because their corresponding sortal, 
a quasi sortal, is constructed on the basis of an accident which is always an accident 
of substance, and not an independent thing itself. Musicalness and justice characterize 
Coriscus who is the real entity, ουσία, denoted by 'that-which-is-musical' and 'that- 
which-is-just'.5 Only 'Coriscus', however, denotes the substance Coriscus in a non­
accidental or essential mode. The proper name 'Coriscus' is associated with the sortal 
man which reflects the very nature of Coriscus as something essentially constituted in 
itself, i.e., an independent entity or substance.6
Some general features concerning the structure of accidental unities may be 
inferred from Aristotle's examples.
An accidental unity is composed of two different expressions in either of two
ways :
(1) A proper name is combined with an instance of a quasi-sortal.
(2) Two instances of quasi-sortais, referring to different quasi-sortais, are combined
with each other.
Aristotle undertakes to show the conditions which underlie the above two ways. 
His method is to appeal to a predicative context which reveals the key role of a single 
substance acting as the subject of the corresponding predicate(s)/attribute(s).7 The 
first kind of accidental unity (A) involves the conjunction of a proper name and an 
instance of a quasi-sortal. Aristotle gives the example of the conjunction of the 
following: 'Coriscus' + 'that-which-is-musical' (rb μουσικόu) . The accidental unity
of the two expressions is, according to Aristotle, equivalent to the expression 'musical 
Coriscus' (Κορίσκοε μουσικόε) . This is so, explains, Aristotle, because it is the same 
thing to say ''Coriscus' and 'that-which-is-musical' (are one)' and ''Musical Coriscus' 
(is one)' (b 18-19). The accidental unity of 'Coriscus' and 'that-which-is-musical' has 
as its condition that one be accidental to the other (6Va θάτερον θατέρΐύ συμβόβηκεν) (b 
22-23). I understand the latter sentence to refer to the predication 'Coriscus is the 
musical thing {rb μουσικοί/)' in which 'musical thing' is predicated of the substance 
Coriscus denoted by 'Coriscus' (cf. ουσία at b 22).8 The accidental unity of the two
3denoting expressions is thus explained through the unity of an accidental predicative 
statement, with substance serving as the link between predication and a corresponding 
state of affairs.
The second kind of accidental unity (B) involves the conjunction of two instances 
of quasi-sortais. Example: 'that-which-is-musical' and 'that-which-is-just'. Their 
accidental union is represented by the unitary complex expression 'the musical and just 
Coriscus' (b 19-20). The condition required here for the two expressions to combine 
in an accidental unity is that they both be accidental to (be predicated of) one (and 
the same) substance (ϋτι μι& οϋσία συμβέβηκεv) (b 22-23). This means that the denoting 
expressions cannot refer to different substances but must refer to one and the same 
substance. This is so when we say 'Coriscus is the musical (thing) and the just thing' 
or severally 'Coriscus is the musical thing' and 'Coriscus is the just thing' (where 
Coriscus stands for one and the same substance).
What might be thought to be a third kind of accidental unity at b 23-24 is actually 
only a version (Al) of the first kind. The elements of the accidental unity are again 
a proper name and an instance of a quasi-sortal with the difference, however, that the 
substance denoted is made explicit in the formulation of the expression. Thus while the 
term used in the first kind of unity, 'that-which-is-musical' , does not make explicit 
the substance denoted, the term used here, 'musical Coriscus', makes this explicit. An 
example of an accidental unity is the conjunction of 'Coriscus' and 'musical Coriscus'. 
Aristotle treats this as an example which resembles 'in a certain way' (6μοίωs τρόπον 
τινά) the example of the first kind of accidental unity (referred to at b 22-23). Thus, 
as by ''Coriscus' and 'that which-is-musical' are one' we understand that 'that-which- 
is-musical' is accidental to (predicated of) Coriscus, so by ''Coriscus' and 'musical 
Coriscus' are one' we understand that 'musical Coriscus' is accidental to (predicated 
of) Coriscus (b 23-26). The terms όμοιωβ ('similarly') at b 23 and οΊον ('as') at b 26 
indicate the analogy. The relation between 'musical Coriscus' and 'Coriscus' is viewed 
by Aristotle as a relation between the elements of a predicative statement (Xóyos): 
'one portion of the statement is accidental to the other (θάτερον των μορίων θατερφ 
συμβέβηκε των iv τω (b 24-5). The possibility of unitary accidental predication
is what establishes the accidental unity of 'Coriscus' and 'musical Coriscus'.9
A fourth example of accidental unity at b 26-27 is subsequently treated as 
exemplifying a version (Bl) of the second kind of accidental unity. In the combination 
of 'musical Coriscus' and 'just Coriscus' discussed here, explicit reference is made 
to the substance, Coriscus, denoted by each of the instances of quasi - sortais. A 
condition for the accidental unity is that one part of each of the denoting expressions, 
'musical' and 'just', respectively, be accidental to the part 'Coriscus' which is 
identical in both and denotes one and the same substance.
In all of Aristotle's examples above, a condition for there being accidental unity 
is that a single substance should be uniquely denoted by the denoting expressions, in 
contexts which allow substance to be the subject of appropriate accidental predications.
In the last part of his discussion, Aristotle considers examples in which not an 
individual substance is the bearer of accidental unity but either a genus (yévos) or 
a universal name (καθόλου ονομα).
By genus Aristotle means a class dependent on an individual instance and expressing 
a genéralized aspect of it. This is the sense in which in the Categories Aristotle 
says :
Since you will call the individual man grammatical, 
therefore (ούκοϋν) you will call both man and animál 
grammatical (3a 4-6).10
4In the case, however, of a universal name no such direct dependence on individual 
instances is implied. Rather a connection between universal concepts is entertained 
in terms of meaningful relations between them. In the latter case, individual cases 
are only a presupposed background but not the context of the discussion.
This distinction enables Aristotle to introduce versions (A2) and (B2) of (Al) 
and (Bl) . Here the use of a proper name is substituted by the use of a universal term.
The example examined is now 'Man and musical man are the same (rb αυτό)' (b 29). 
Presumably Aristotle replaces 'one' by 'the same' because of the suggestion of 
numerical oneness in the previous uses of 'one' which is not suitable in the present 
universal context.
If 'man' is understood in the sense of a universal name, the example above can be 
taken to exemplify a modification of (Al), the new version (A2). A condition of 
accidental unity is that 'man', as a 'musical thing', should be accidental to man as 
his predicate (b 30-31).
Another alternative is to take 'man' in the sense of genus. In this case we have 
a modification of (Bl), the new version (B2), because 'man' and 'musical man' are 
regarded as expressions denoting an individual substance, Coriscus. 'Man' and 'musical 
man' are regarded now as expressions denoting an individual substance, Coriscus. What 
enables 'man' and 'musical man' to join in an accidental unity is the fact that they 
are both accidental to (συμβέβηκεν) a given individual thing, Coriscus (b 31-32). Yet 
in contrast to the examples in (B) and (Bl), here one of the expressions, man, relates 
to Coriscus in an essential mode of denoting, because it applies to him as a natural 
kind associated with the essential nature of Coriscus (âs 7¿ι/os κα\ εν ty¡ ουσία) . If 
so, 'being accidental to' (σνμβέβηκ,εν) Coriscus at b 32 indicates a formal, logical 
relation and not an ontological one. 'Musical man', on the other hand, denotes 
Coriscus in an accidental mode, because it is associated with a state or affection of 
Coriscus (b 32-34). Aristotle's commentary regarding the items which enter into the 
composition of the accidental unity under (B2) may indicate his reluctance to consider 
(B2) as a mere version of (B) and (Bl). More strictly, perhaps, the unity of 'man' and 
'musical man' should be considered to exemplify a different kind of accidental unity.
k k k
While Aristotle's discussion of accidental unity pertains, as I have argued, to 
the realm of language and cannot be dissociated from matters of semantics and 
predication, his approach to essential unity (εν καθ'αΰτό) (1015b 36-1017a 6) is 
entitative. Aristotle is interested here in things (entities) which are called one 
essentially (καθ'aérée εν λεγάμενα). This means that essential unity in the entitative 
sense has a contrary which is not that of the previous section.
A brief passage at 1016b 6-9 seems to refer to contexts in which things would be 
called one in an accidental way, though Aristotle does not explicitly characterize 
these things as accidentally one:
While most things, then, are said to be one in so far 
as they do, have, undergo, or relate to another thing, 
things called one in a primary way (πρωτωβ) are those 
whose being (ουσία) is one; it is one either in 
continuity, or in form, or in definition.
On the one hand, then, there are things which are called one because of a shared 
relation or connection to some one thing. On the other hand, there are things which 
are called one primarily, because of what they are in their own right. It would seem
5that the former are to be taken as things that are one accidentally, in the entitative 
sense, in opposition to things which are essentially one {εν καθ'αυτά).
Aristotle's objective is to distinguish the different kinds of things which are 
called one essentially. He discusses first things which are called one on account of 
their being continuous (τω συνεχή εΤναι) (1015b 36-1016a 1 ).
Aristotle proposes the following list: a bundle of sticks made continuous by a
tie, planks of wood continuous by glue, a line, even if bent, a limb, e.g. a leg or an 
arm (a 1-3).
At first sight one may be puzzled by the example of the bundle: 'How can
Aristotle consider the bundle to be a continuous thing --we may ask -- given the fact 
that it is an assemblage of discrete continuous things?' Soon, however, we realize 
that Aristotle employs here a kinetic conception of’the one-continuous which is as such 
independent of the familiar distinction between the contiguous and continuous. What is 
significant from this perspective is the fact that the sticks are held spatially 
together by means of the string and thus the whole bundle can be subjected to one 
indivisible motion in which the motion of the constituent parts -- the sticks -- is 
identical to the motion of the whole bundle. The constituent parts of the bundle -- 
the sticks -- or the constituent parts of the box -- the planks of wood -- require 
something external, the string or the glue, by means of which they can be held together 
in a cohesive, extensive unity. In this sense they are continuous by art. The bundle 
or the box are continuous insofar as the motion of each is one and indivisible. Their 
being one consists in their being continuous. And their being continuous is specified 
in terms of their motion. Accordingly, anything capable of a separate, unitary motion 
is one and continuous.
Aristotle asserts initially that things which are continuous by nature are more 
one (μάλλον εν) than things which are continuous by art (b 4). Presumably this is 
because the former are intrinsically capable of motion while the latter are not. He 
then proceeds to characterize the continuous in terms of motion.
Continuous is said to be that whose motion is one essentially and cannot be other­
wise (11. 5-6),14 in the sense that it excludes any internal variability with respect 
to the motion of the parts of the whole (cf. 11. 15-16). 'One motion' is further 
explained as 'indivisible motion' and the latter is in turn specified as being so 
'according to time' (11. 5-6). Thus, while a straight line is in motion, it has all 
its parts moving simultaneously at all times, and it cannot be the case that some part 
with magnitude should be at rest and another in motion (11. 15-16) .11 According to this 
principle of indivisibility of motion in time (cf. 11. 5-6), the motion of any part of 
a the whole coincides, at all times during the duration of the motion (in direction and 
velocity) with the motion of any other part as well as with the motion of the whole.
The above is the description of what is perfectly one -- continuous in the kinetic 
sense. The motion of the line is to be understood, I think, as an idealized, abstract 
representation of the motion of concrete, physical things from the point of view of 
their having or not having a joint or bend,12 as we shall presently see.
Aristotle, as if to show that he has not discarded the distinction he drew in the 
Physics between continuous (συνεχή) and tangent (απτάμενα) things,13 at a 7-9 notes:
Those things are continuous by themselves {καθ'αυτά 
συνεχή) which are not one by contact {&<f>jj) ; for if you 
put planks of wood in contact with one another you will 
not say that they are one plank, or body, or anything 
else continuous.
6V *
I take it that by καθ'αυτά συνεχή, Aristotle has in mind things considered as 
continuous outside their relation to motion, which is not, however, the present 
context. Immediately after this apparent digression, he returns to the things which 
are continuous in a general (i.e. the kinetic) sense (oAo>s συνεχή) (1.9).14
Aristotle accommodates a less stringent conception of the one-continuous compared 
to the paradigm case of the straight line, by distinguishing between things which have 
a bend (κάμφιν) and those which have not (11. 2, 10-17). Thus a leg or an arm have a 
bend and a line can be bent in an angle (1.13) while the shin or the thigh and the 
straight line have no bend.
Aristotle considers all of the above to be one (one by nature) but he argues that 
the shin or the thigh is more one (μάλλον *iv) than a leg, since it is possible for the 
motion of the leg not to be one (11.10-12) .15 On the other hand, a bent line can be 
viewed ambiguously both as one and not one, since it is possible for its parts which 
join at an angle to move simultaneously or not to move simultaneously or for one part 
to be at rest while the other is in motion (11.13-15).
We use 'one' in a different way, Aristotle points out next, when we indicate that 
the subject (r¿> υποκείμενον) is undifferentiated in form. As the subsequent discussion 
of this shows, by subject Aristotle means here matter (ϋΧη).ie
Kirwan translates %v Χέηεται, το υποκείμενον T(j> εϊδει εΐναι èc8 ιάφορον at al7-18 as 
'a thing is called one from its subject's being undifferentiated in form', and in his 
notes he remarks: 'Although Aristotle defines in this paragraph, a sense in which e.g. 
a pane of glass and a pond of water would be one, his examples predicate 'one' of the 
materials themselves -- water, wine, juice, etc.'17 I do not think that Kirwan is 
justified to assume that what is at issue here is the relative sense of matter as 'the 
material of one thing or another'. On the contrary, Aristotle seems to have in mind 
matter in the absolute sense of stuff, taken independently of its relation to 
individual things. The above should be translated '...'one' is used, insofar as the 
subject [i.e. matter] is undifferentiated in form'. Aristotle explains that matter is 
undifferentiated in form in being indivisible according to perception (11.17-19). The 
relevant form here is perceptible form. Matter is one in so far as no qualitative 
distinction is made in perceiving any part of it. It would seem that Aristotle views 
the unity of a certain kind of matter in terms of a given set of repeatable perceptible 
qualities. Aristotle further notes that the subject (matter) can either refer to the 
first subject, or to the last one in a descending order. I take it that Aristotle has 
in mind here a distinction between a specific (first subject) and a generic sense (last 
subject) of matter (11. 24-28). This distinction is illustrated through examples. 
Thus, on the one hand, wine and water are severally called one insofar as each of them, 
as first subject, is indivisible according to its (specific) form, and, on the other 
hand, the fluids (such as oil, wine, etc.), as well as the meltables,18 are called one 
because the last (generic) subject of all is the same. For all these share the same 
(generic) nature, e.g. water or air (11.19-24).
Aristotle uses as transition from a physical perspective on unity to a logico- 
epistemological one the discussion of the unity of genus which bears similarities to 
the unity of matter. Things are called one, in a new use of 'one', whose genus (rb 
yivos) is one, differentiated according to opposite differentiae. It is clear that 
the things which are called one here are the species of a given genus (cf 1.30). They 
are one because the genus, which is the subject to the differentiae (rb Υποκείμενον 
rais δίαφοραίs) is one. For example, horse, man, dog are one something, because they 
are all animals (11.24-27). The genus is one as subject to the differentiae, according 
to Aristotle, in a way similar to that in which matter is one (11.27-28) .19 Aristotle 
seems to be treating here the genus as a unity which can be identified independently of
7its differentiae which differentiate it into different species, in a similar way to 
that in which matter as last subject has an identity of its own, independently of the 
matter-species above it.
The unity discussed above was the unity of the proximate genus in terms of which 
horse, man, and dog were said to be one qua animals. Aristotle discusses next the 
unity of the genus above the proximate one (το άνω y evos) with reference to which the 
genera at the lowest level of such hierarchy, which he calls last (τελευταία) -- 
probably in a comparative sense -- are said to be one. They are one because the genus 
above the proximate one is the same. Thus the isosceles and the equilateral are called 
one and the same figure, since they are both triangles, though not the same triangles 
(since they differ in the number of equal sides) (11.28-32).20
Kirwan presents Aristotle's point in terms of the formula, 'x and y are the G if 
both are F, and G is the genus of F', and notes: ''If they are the last forms of the 
genus' seems to stipulate (i) that 'x' and 'y' mark place for form (i.e. species) 
descriptions rather than proper names and (ii) that the species be the infimae species 
of x and y. It is not clear why either of these conditions is necessary.'21 I shall 
respond to this by noting, first, that the whole section 1016a 24-f 6, as I see it, 
deals with universals and the unity characteristic to them, and hence proper names are 
inapplicable here; and, second, that, as I suggested above, we need not take τελευταία 
του yévovs είδη in the sense of the infimae species. They are the last from the bottom 
in a triadic hierarchy of genera but not necessarily qua infimae species. Probably the 
term εΐSos does not have here the technical sense of species but simply the sense of a 
form of genus. Such an cJSos would itself be a y¿vos, in the broad sense of kind or 
class.
Exploring further the unity of genera that are subordinate to something else, 
Aristotle introduces a definitional point of vi*w and asserts that two genera are one 
insofar as the linguistic expression of what they are (S Xoyos ο το t ¿ 7¡v ¿Tvoll \¿yu>v) ,
i.e. their definition, does not express anything that divides them (àSiaiperos) but 
expresses the same thing. E.g. 'that which is the subject of growth' (to ηύξημενον) 
and 'that which is the subject of diminution' (φθΐνον) are definitionally one in 
presumably having in common the definition 'that which is the subject of quantitative 
change' . This definition is indivisible (one and the same) and hence they are one. 
This is similar to the case of figures which share one form. Thus the isosceles and 
the equilateral, are one figure (e.g. three-sided, rectilinear figure). Aristotle 
parenthetically remarks that his reference to things having an indivisible definition 
is not meant to deny that their definition taken in itself is divisible (namely into 
genus and differentia) (11.32a-b 1).
Introducing next a noetic perspective, Aristotle stipulates that those things are 
most strictly (μάλιστα) one whose conception (νάησιβ) relative to their essence is 
indivisible and excludes separation, either in time, or place, or definition. This - 
- explains Aristotle -- especially applies to substances (b 1-3).
Both Ross and Kirwan assume that the above triple indivisibility is connected with 
that of a single individual.22 It seems to me that there is no need for such an 
assumption since, as I have argued, Aristotle is concerned here with the unity of 
universals. Since a universal is not in place and time and is the proper object of 
definition its conception would be paradigmatic of the above indivisibility. From a 
noetic point of view, unity belongs par excellence to essences of substance kinds.23 
Generally, Aristotle adds, to the extent that something can be conceived as 
indivisible, it is said to be one. E.g. , man qua man, animal qua animal, and magnitude 
qua magnitude, in the respect precisely in which they involve no division, i.e. as far 
as their own specific, generic or quantitative nature is concerned, are said to be one 
man, one animal, and one magnitude respectively (11. 3-6).
8A still different sense of 'one' is that of the 'whole' (cfXou) . It is introduced 
by Aristotle in response to an inadequate view of the individual thing which confines 
its unity to spatial continuity and quantitative distinctness. 'Although we say that 
in a sense anything is one if it is a quantity and continuous, yet, in another sense, 
we deny it unless the thing is some kind of whole (Ήλον), i.e. unless it has one form 
(eÍSos) (b 11-13). 'Whole' and 'form' have here a normative force. Without the form 
the thing lacks the characteristic unity of the whole and it is instead a conglomerate 
of parts. Such is a compound of misassembled parts of a shoe. It is only when the 
shoe has its parts correctly assembled that it has a form and it is really a shoe. 
For this reason also a circular line which is whole and complete (οΧη και τεΧειos) is 
'more one' than all other lines (11.13-17).
Aristotle takes care to underline that the form responsible for the whole is one 
(11.13, 16). The unity of the whole is the unity of a single form. Yet in Aristotle's 
examples the role of the form responsible for the whole seems to be cashed out in 
different ways. The aspect stressed in the shoe example is the proper arrangement of 
the parts; the aspect focused upon in the circular line example is the outline and 
shape that is exemplified in a perfect manner. The circular line, in comparison to 
other lines, lacks nothing. One can lengthen a straight line at either end; one cannot 
do this to a circle since it is perfectly complete.
Up to 1016b, Aristotle was preoccupied with the general question, 'What are the 
things which are called one (X¿ycrcu îu)?1 A common characteristic to all those things 
as unities was that, in one way or the other, they were all indivisible. But at b 18- 
23 a different approach is taken when the one itself is made the object of inquiry and 
Aristotle asks the essentialist question: 'What is for the one to be one?' The one is
treated now as a universal whose nature is that of being a first measure. Qua first 
measure the one has the status of an epistemic principle.
The extant text at b 18 makes a definitional connection between one as principle 
and one as principle of number. This, as Christ has argued, seems to be the result of 
a gloss.25 The one as principle of number does not belong to the general essence of the 
one but is only a particular specification of the one. Christ proposed the bracketing 
of αρι,θμφ and I agree. Accordingly, the text at b 17-18 should read as follows: rb δε
cul cîuou &ρχη tlul εστtu [&ρίθμ&] cluai ('to be one is to be a principle with respect 
to something'). The one as defined here is a universal object which requires to be 
further specified. Its particular specifications differ according to different genera 
of inquiry. The one as measure is in each case something first and indivisible with 
respect to the domain to which it applies as a means of knowledge. While in one genus 
the one-principle is the quarter-tone (i.e. the minimal interval in music), in another 
(in language) it is the vowel or the consonant; something else is the one-principle 
with respect to weight and something else with respect to motion (11.b 17-23).
Each of the measures-principles above has a definite content which is indivisible 
and one. At b 23-24, Aristotle draws a dichotomy between two kinds of 'one'. On the 
one hand there is the 'one' which is indivisible (ècStaipcrou) in quantity (τω ποσω), 
and on the other hand, there is the 'one' which is indivisible in form (εϊδει). I take 
it that all the examples listed above are of the kind which is indivisible in form 
because each one of them has a unitary intelligible content. Indivisibility in 
quantity, however, is of a different kind since it is not an indivisibility of a given 
intelligible content but a posited indivisibility whose nature is formal and not 
material. Aristotle defines two irreducible kinds of such indivisible items: 'What
is indivisible in respect of quantity in all dimensions is called a unit (μouás) if it 
has no position (Kdcrou), a point if it has position (dcaiu ^xou)' (b 24-26; Kirwan's 
trans.). Ross in his notes refers to the Pythagorean definition of the point as μoucιs 
θεσυν εχουσα (a unit having position) (Proclus in Eucl. p. 95.26).26 This is however 
misleading because Aristotle is careful not to explain the point in terms of the unit.
9Unit and point are defined independently of one another as different kinds of 
indivisible quantity whose very content is indivisibility. The line is subsequently 
described as indivisible only in one way (i.e. in length), the plane in two ways (i.e. 
in length and breadth), and the body as totally divisible (i.e. in all three 
dimensions) (11.26-28). Beginning with the plane, Aristotle repeats the series of 
definitions in reverse order (plane, line, unit, point) indicating perhaps the presence 
of a systematic sequence among the items concerned (11.28-31).
Aristotle introduces next a connected series of kinds of unity on a ladder of 
generality rising from numerical unity (tu άριθμω), through formal unity (tu είδα,) 
and generic («catégorial) unity (tu yéua,) to analogical unity (tu áuaXoyia). What is 
distinctive of the new schema is that it establishes a hierarchy of unity having at its 
basis one or more individual things with respect to which different levels of unity are 
distinguished, implying a corresponding distance in generality from the individual 
thing(s). Aristotle draws the distinction between things which are one either in 
number, or form, or genus, or analogy. 'Things which are one in number are those whose 
matter is one' (11. 32-31), says Aristotle. By itself this laconic reference to 'one 
matter' is not very illuminating, and one has to resort to conjectures. Most likely, 
Aristotle refers to an individual niece of matter as the basis for the numerical 
distinction27 of one individual thing from another individual thing of the same species 
or of different species. Aristotle describes as one in form (εϊδει) those things whose 
definition (Χόη/os) is one (1. 33). I think that the expression 'one in form' should be 
understood broadly in the sense of 'one in kind' independently of the level of 
generality. According to this broad sense, one in form are Socrates and Plato because 
of their identical definition, as men, but also one in form are a man and a horse 
because of their identical definition, as animals.28
Thus the next level of unity concerns generic unity in the special sense of 
catégorial unity. Here genus indicates what has no genus above it and is a genus in 
itself or absolutely. Aristotle says that those things are one in genus whose figure 
of predication (το σχήμα rfjs κατη^οpías) is one (11. 33-34). The expression 'figure 
of predication' in association with 'being' as 'figure of the predication of being' 
appears again in Met. Δ 28, 1024b 13, in a context in which Aristotle discusses things 
which are said to be different in genus. There he explicitly connects the figures of 
the predication of being with the different categories (cf. 1024b 9-16). It would 
seem, then, that also in Δ 6, by things whose figure of predication is one, Aristotle 
means things which are categorially one. It is in this sense that they are one in 
genus.
Finally one by analogy (according to ratio, áua Xéyou) are things, says Aristotle, 
which are related 'as the other to another' (11. 34-35). The unity of things here is 
based on a correspondence between the relations which are severally exhibited by two 
pairs of things.
Discussing the logical connections among things one in number, one in form, one 
in genus and one by analogy, Aristotle observes that the later unity (i.e. the more 
universal) always follows (is entailed by) the earlier one (i.e. the less universal). 
Thus things which are one in number are also (in what they entail) things which are 
one in form but the reverse does not obtain in all cases. Again, things which are one 
in genus are entailed by things which are one in form, and things which are one by 
analogy, by things which are one in genus, but not vice-versa in all cases (11. 1016b 
35-1017a 3).
Kirwan formulates the entailment of analogical unity by the generic unity as 
follows: 'If X and y are in one genus G, they are also one in analogy in that
x:G::y:G'.28 I think this formula rightly suggests that Aristotle does not have in 
mind here a trans-catégorial analogical unity since the whole ladder of unities, in
the present schema, is based on the unity of numerically distinct individuals, which 
are of course in the category of substance.
In conclusion, the following are according to my interpretation the kinds of 
essential unity discussed in Met. Δ6, in the order of their presentation, and 
abstracting from the issue of their affinities and groupings.
1) Unity of the continuous thing understood in terms of its motion.
2) Unity of matter in terms of the unity of its form, seen from a perceptual-
qualitative point of view.
3) Unity among universale as kinds/classes.
4) Unity in terms of the essential definition associated with the unity of 
conception.
5) Unity of the whole.
6) Unity of the measure-principle.
7) Quantitative-mathematical unity.
8) Numerical, formal, catégorial and analogical unity.
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1. W.D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 301.
2. Christopher Kirwan, Aristotle's Metaphysics Books Γ. Δ. E (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1971), 134.
3. Ibid, 135.
4. A perceptive analysis, to which I am indebted, of Aristotle's sui generis semantics
of accidental sameness, which parallels that of accidental unity, has been given 
by F. J .· Pelletier in 'Sameness and Referential Opacity in Aristotle', Nous 13 
(1979), 283-311. Pelletier underlines the role of description in Aristotle's 
semantics: "... the description a has a certain relation to the description ß,
i.e., the analysis given of what it is for objects (or an object) to be the same 
is in terms of relations between expressions which denote them (it). And it is 
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kinds of sameness." (p.291) See also the section on The Categories as Classes of 
Names in L.M. De Rijk's study 'On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics' , 
Part 3, Vivarium 18 (1980), 1-62.
5. Obala at 1015b 22 should be understood not merely in the catégorial sense but also, 
and primarily, in the sense of real entity, independent being. Compare obaia 
σνμβεβηκεν here with τω 8vtl σνμβεβηκεν at Δ7, 1017a 16.
6. The semantic model of denoting I have employed here does not require, from an 
ontological point of view, any other kind of entity besides substance and accident. 
It can dispense with 'kooky objects' (G.B. Matthews' expression) exemplified by 
entities which Mohan Matthen calls 'predicative complexes', e.g. pale-Coriscus, 
healthy-Socrates. According to Matthen, '[p]redicative complexes constitute a 
third ontological realm distinct both from individual substances and from 
predicables' ('Greek Ontology and the 'Is' of Truth', Phronesis 28 (1983), 129).
7. Pelletier, op. cit. 300-1.
8. It should be noted that what we may call 'identity statements' exemplify for 
Aristotle predicative statements.
9. Kirwan, wrongly in my opinion, understands \6yos as referring simply to the formula 
'artistic [musical] Coriscus' of which, according to him, one part, i.e. 'artistic' 
('the property of being artistic') is 'capable of coinciding in Coriscus'. By 
translating ofov as Ί  mean' at b 26, he leaves out the analogy between the new 
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10. Cf. Met. Z5, 1020b 20-21.
11. This seems to exclude the points at which a line can be divided as well as the 
extremities of a line which are not strictly parts of a line but have a purely 
formal status which exempts them from being in motion. Cf. Phvs. 220a 10-17.
12. Compare 1016a 13-15 with Movement of Animals. 702a 22f.
13. Phvs. 231a 22-3: '...continuous if their extremities are one (εν); in contact if
their extremities are together (ίέμα)'. Cf. also Aristotle's definition of the 
continuous: Ί  understand a thing to be continuous when the touching limits of
the respective parts become one and the same' (227a 11-12).
12
14. Ross suggests that Aristotle's position on the continuous in Met. Δ6 is inadequate.
He comments on 1.5: 'The continuous is better defined in Phys. V.3 without
reference to movement, which is not really an element in the notion.' What Ross 
has failed to appreciate is Aristotle's deliberate treatment here of the one- 
continuous from a kinetic perspective.
15. At 1016a 10-11, κα\ %τ ι μάλλον (sc. \v λέγεται, cf. 11. 9-10) rh. μη ϊχοντα κάμφιν
suggests a stricter use of eiv in their respect and hence a superior status of their 
unity; whereas κα\ εύθεΊα τη s κεκαμμόνηε μάλλον *εν at 11. 12-12 suggests a
difference in the degree of unity. —
16. Cf. Δ 28, 1024b 9: '... the subject, which we call matter'.
17. Op. cit.. 136.
18. Cf. Δ 4, 1015a 10.
19. Jaeger inserts Έ>ν in front of η %λη μία at 1016a 28. This is unwarranted if I am 
right in thinking that Aristotle's earlier discussion dealt with matter per se. 
in its character of stuff, and not as a constituent of material things or 
substances.
20. Aristotle's expressions 'o^ rcos εν λέγεται', 'Src δέ ταντον λέγεται' (11. 29-30)
suggest manners of talk or linguistic description (cf. 11. 25-26). Aristotle is 
interested not only in the different kinds of generic unity but also in the 
different ways we talk about it. Cf. Phys. 224a 4-12, especially 11. 6-7: 'Things
are called the same-so-and-so in so far as they do not differ by a differentia, but 
not in so far as they differ.'
21. Kirwan, op. cit.. 137.
22. Ross, op. cit.. 303; Kirwan, op. cit.. 138.
23. Cf. Met. I 1, 1052a 35-b 1; De An. Ill, 430b 14-17.
24. Cf. Met. I 1, 1052b 28 where the one is described as above all (κνριωτατα) the 
measure of quantity but not as simply the measure of quantity.
25. Christ, Studia in Aristotelis Libros Metaphvsicos Collata. Berlin, 1853, 36-7. 
Christ attributes the imported gloss to the influence of 1021a 13-14, rb 8'^ .v roO 
btpiB μου αρχή acoY μετρον, and of I 1, 1052b 23-4, to %v ^αριθμόν αρχή ^ αριθμό s.
26. Ross, op. cit.. 304.
27. Cf. Phys., 190b 24-25: 'For the man, the gold, and in general the matter are
countable (h $λη &ριθμητη) ' ; Met. A 8, 1074a 34-35: 'But things which are many
in number have matter.'
28. Kirwan, o p . cit.. 140.
